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 THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS 
VERONICA ROOT* 
Even as regulators and prosecutors proclaim the importance of effective compliance 
programs, failures persist. Organizations fail to ensure that they and their agents 
comply with legal and regulatory requirements, industry practices, and their own 
internal policies and norms. From the companies that provide our news, to the 
financial institutions that serve as our bankers, to the corporations that make our 
cars, compliance programs fail to prevent misconduct each and every day. The 
causes of these compliance failures are multifaceted and include general 
enforcement deficiencies, difficulties associated with overseeing compliance 
programs within complex organizations, and failures to establish a culture of 
compliance throughout the organizational structure. In short, creating an effective 
compliance program is an inherently difficult task.  
And yet, it may be that organizations can improve compliance within their 
organizations by rethinking the way they approach the compliance challenge. This 
Article—drawing on insights from cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, and 
behavioral ethics—sets forth a new method of evaluating compliance failures that 
focuses on the compliance process, which has the distinct, albeit interrelated, stages 
of prevention, detection, investigation, and remediation. The Article argues that 
utilizing a process frame will assist industry leaders, regulators, and policymakers 
in conducting more effective root-cause analyses of compliance failures, which will 
lead to the creation, implementation, and better evaluation of compliance programs. 
Delineating clear boundaries for the stages within the compliance process is 
difficult, but getting these distinctions right is essential when confronted with 
significant or complex compliance failures, particularly when an organization lacks 
a robust commitment to compliance. Additionally, the process frame can be utilized 
across regulatory areas and corporate forms, which serves to cement compliance as 
its own proper field worthy of further inquiry and study. By focusing on “The 
Compliance Process,” organizations, policymakers, and scholars will improve the 
tools available for them to assist in the creation and implementation of effective 
compliance programs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Regulators, prosecutors, corporations, and their members dedicate a great deal of 
time and resources to implement the ever-elusive “effective compliance program.” 
Compliance refers to a firm’s effort to ensure that it and its agents adhere to legal 
and regulatory requirements, industry practice, and the firm’s own internal policies 
and norms. Organizations from all over the world, out of fear of sanction, harm, 
retribution, or ridicule, initiate programs aimed at making certain that their 
employees and members maintain compliance with external and internal norms and 
requirements. Yet every year seems to bring another set of significant scandals within 
organizations. 
From fake accounts to faulty ignition switches to bribed foreign officials, serious 
and pervasive corporate misdeeds continue to occur, and these misdeeds are very 
often labeled “a compliance failure.”1 When compliance failures occur, organizations 
inevitably end up focusing on how the compliance program itself failed, so that the 
firm can implement a compliance program that will ensure that future, similar 
misconduct does not occur. For the most complex of compliance failures, however, 
inquiries framed from the perspective of how a compliance program failed can be 
relatively broad and potentially unwieldy. As this Article demonstrates, however, an 
organization’s compliance program consists of four distinct stages within a 
compliance process: prevention, detection, investigation, and remediation. When 
compliance failures are assessed through a process frame, greater clarity regarding 
the nature of the compliance program’s failure may be discerned. 
For example, starting in July 2016, a sexual harassment scandal emerged at Fox 
News, which is owned by a subsidiary of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.,2 leading 
to the dismissal of Roger Ailes, the former chief executive officer of Fox News, 
among others.3 The public scandal began when a former Fox News anchor, Gretchen 
                                                                                                             
 
 1. The amorphous “compliance failure” distinction covers a huge swath of behavior 
across dozens of industries in public and private firms, which is perhaps unsurprising when 
one considers that a diverse set of firms will be subject to different legal and regulatory 
requirements.   
 2. Fox News provides reporting on current and political events occurring within the 
United States and across the world. It is owned by Fox Entertainment Group, which is a 
subsidiary of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. Twenty-First Century Fox has a “portfolio[] of 
cable, broadcast, film, pay TV and satellite assets spanning six continents across the globe.” 
It “[r]each[es] more than 1.8 billion subscribers in approximately 50 local languages every 
day.” Investor Relations, 21ST CENTURY FOX, https://www.21cf.com/investor-relations 
[https://perma.cc/SZP4-C4DH]. 
 3. Jonathan Stempel, 21st Century Fox in $90 Million Settlement Tied to Sexual 
Harassment Scandal, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2017, 6:02 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us 
-fox-settlement/21st-century-fox-in-90-million-settlement-tied-to-sexual-harassment-scandal 
-idUSKBN1DK2NI [https://perma.cc/E3MB-6MTT]. 
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Carlson, filed a lawsuit accusing Roger Ailes of engaging in sexual harassment.4 
Prior to being dismissed from Fox News and filing suit, Carlson recorded all private 
meetings between herself and Ailes for over a year and a half.5 The recordings 
included remarks from Ailes such as, “I think you and I should have had a sexual 
relationship a long time ago, and then you’d be good and better and I’d be good and 
better.”6 Upon Carlson filing suit, several other women alleged similar accounts 
detailing experiences of sexual harassment from Ailes.7 Ailes departed as chief 
executive officer of Fox News about two weeks after Carlson filed suit,8 but her 
complaint triggered a reckoning within the organization.9  
Upon reviewing the events at Fox News, one natural conclusion is that the 
organization failed to create, implement, and execute an effective compliance 
program that would properly address and respond to sexual harassment in the 
workplace. That conclusion, given the depth and breadth of the alleged misconduct 
at Fox News, provides an insufficient basis for fully assessing the root causes of the 
compliance failure. But when a process frame is employed, additional details appear 
explaining why the sexual harassment program failed.  
First, it appears Fox News failed to engage in activities likely to effectively 
prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. For example, Fox News,10 like many 
organizations,11 relied on sexual harassment training to prevent misconduct in its 
workplace. Organizations rely on training to prevent misconduct, in part, because of 
two Supreme Court rulings from the late 1990s.12 However, in 2015 “the EEOC 
established a task force to investigate workplace harassment and concluded that 
‘much of the training done over the last 30 years has not worked as a prevention 
                                                                                                             
 
 4. Tom Huddleston Jr., Roger Ailes Resigns: A Timeline of His Downfall, FORTUNE (July 
21, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/21/roger-ailes-resigned-scandal-timeline [https://perma 
.cc/75GK-JHFA]. 
 5. Michael M. Grynbaum & John Koblin, Fox Settles with Gretchen Carlson over Roger 
Ailes Sex Harassment Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2016/09/07/business/media/fox-news-roger-ailes-gretchen-carlson-sexual-harassment 
-lawsuit-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/2G33-WBRE]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Huddleston, supra note 4. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Emily Steel & Michael S. Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Settled New Harassment Claim, 
Then Fox Renewed His Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/10/21/business/media/bill-oreilly-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/FR6L 
-YCBY].  
 10. Non-Monetary Relief at 1–2, 14, City of Monroe Emps.’ Ret. Sys. ex rel. Twenty-
First Century Fox, Inc. v. Murdoch, No. 2017-0833-AGB (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2017) (As part 
of this agreement, Fox News agreed to “continue to conduct ‘live’ harassment and 
discrimination training for every employee.”). 
 11. Claire Suddath, Why Can’t We Stop Sexual Harassment at Work?, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-sexual 
-harassment-policy [https://perma.cc/8UVV-RPSQ]. 
 12. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (creating a two-part 
affirmative defense allowing employers to avoid sex discrimination liability when following 
best practices); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (adopting the same 
two-part affirmative defense). 
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tool.’”13 Thus, while Fox News was likely complying with industry standards and 
best practices when utilizing sexual harassment training, the training activities it 
engaged in may not have been likely to prevent workplace sexual harassment. And 
Fox News failed to respond to new information and guidance that revealed the pitfalls 
and drawbacks of relying primarily on training to prevent sexual harassment in the 
workplace.14 Additionally, Fox News allegedly developed a culture where men were 
valued for making robust commentary while women were valued for their physical 
attributes.15 It does not appear that Fox News engaged in activity to prevent the 
commodification of women within its workforce.  
Second, Fox News failed to detect sexual harassment within its organization. 
Sexual harassment, like many employment law issues, puts the onus on the victim to 
self-report misconduct. At Fox News, an alleged culture existed where women were 
afraid of reporting harassment. For instance, Megyn Kelly, a former Fox News 
television journalist who also alleged sexual harassment by Ailes, stated she believes 
the men at the center of the sexual harassment scandals “actively worked to suppress 
them and scare the other women.”16 Additionally, the detection mechanisms 
established at Fox News would have allowed Ailes to effectively stifle any 
                                                                                                             
 
 13. Suddath, supra note 11. One reason posited for why training is an ineffective 
prevention tool is “that both managers and workers regard it as a pro forma exercise aimed at 
limiting the employer’s legal liability.” Yuki Noguchi, Trainers, Lawyers Say Sexual 
Harassment Training Fails, NPR (Nov. 8, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.npr.org 
/2017/11/08/562641787/trainers-lawyers-say-sexual-harassment-training-fails [https://perma 
.cc/7H2N-SVYU]. Focusing on the legality of the harassment is a problem because “the letter 
of the law prohibits ‘severe or pervasive’ harassment when, in fact . . . there are plenty of 
examples that might not meet that standard but clearly should not be tolerated in the 
workplace.” Id. Further, most training courses are online, which do not appropriately engage 
employees. Id.  
At best, research has found, [online sexual harassment] training succeeds in 
teaching people basic information, like the definition of harassment and how to 
report violations. At worst, it can make them uncomfortable, prompting 
defensive jokes, or reinforce gender stereotypes, potentially making harassment 
worse. Either way, it usually fails to address the root problem: preventing sexual 
harassment from happening in the first place. 
Claire Cain Miller, Sexual Harassment Training Doesn’t Work. But Some Things Do., N.Y. 
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/upshot/sexual 
-harassment-workplace-prevention-effective.html [https://perma.cc/3PYY-BHHE]. 
 14. While the EEOC still emphasizes that training is better than no training, it wants 
companies to “supplement training with initiatives that emphasize broader topics such as 
civility and respect.” Suddath, supra note 11.   
 15. Fox News developed a reputation for “[b]lustery male commentators and women, just 
as qualified, who were showcased for their looks with revealing clothes and camera shots.” 
Mike Snider, Sexual Harassment at Fox News: Murdochs Overhaul Culture with Eyes on Sky, 
KITSAP SUN (July 17, 2017, 2:49 PM), https://www.kitsapsun.com/story/money/business 
/2017/07/17/sexual-harassment-fox-news-murdochs-overhaul-culture-eyes-sky/460303001 
[https://perma.cc/6YWT-MP8B]. 
 16. Dominic Patten, Megyn Kelly on Why Harvey Weinstein’s “Done”, Sexual 
Harassment Solutions, Doubling Down & Rising Ratings, DEADLINE (Nov. 9, 2017, 7:45 AM), 
http://deadline.com/2017/11/megyn-kelly-sexual-harassment-interview-harvey-weinstein 
-fox-news-roger-ailes-experiences-1202203810 [https://perma.cc/C9LB-H9CE]. 
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investigations because human resources, the department that would receive sexual 
harassment claims, reported to Roger Ailes.17  
Third, Fox News initially failed to investigate sexual harassment when alerted to 
potential misconduct. For example, a biography of Ailes published in 2014 included 
multiple stories of women, the majority of which remained unnamed, who reported 
being sexually harassed by Ailes.18 It does not appear that this information was acted 
upon by appropriate channels within Fox News or Twenty-First Century Fox. After 
becoming aware of Carlson’s allegations, Twenty-First Century Fox did, however, 
retain an external law firm to initiate an internal investigation into the alleged sexual 
harassment by Ailes. Based on the findings of the internal review, at least six 
additional women claimed Ailes behaved inappropriately toward them.19 
Fourth, Fox News struggled to remediate and properly address sexual harassment 
claims. For example, after Ailes was dismissed from Fox News, allegations were 
brought against then Fox News megastar Bill O’Reilly.20 These were not the first 
allegations brought against O’Reilly, as settlements were entered into for claims 
alleging sexual harassment by O’Reilly in 2002, 2004, 2011, as well as two in 2016.21 
Twenty-First Century Fox allowed O’Reilly to designate the latter allegations as a 
“personal matter” and permitted him to settle the sixth claim in January 2017 without 
disclosing the parameters of the settlement to Twenty-First Century Fox.22 The 
settlement amount, which was subsequently disclosed to the public, was $32 
million.23 Despite this history and awareness of conduct that resulted in repeated 
settlements for alleged sexual harassment, in February 2017, Twenty-First Century 
Fox granted O’Reilly a four-year contract extension that paid him $25 million a 
year.24 Additionally, upon learning of Ailes and O’Reilly’s alleged repeat 
misconduct, instead of sending a strong signal regarding the need to conduct an 
extensive overhaul of its policies and procedures regarding sexual harassment, then 
executive cochairman of Twenty-First Century Fox, Rupert Murdoch, stated in 
December 2017 that the Fox News sexual harassment scandal was “[a]ll nonsense, 
there was a problem with our chief executive, sort of, over the years, isolated 
incidents.” 25 Yet, more than two dozen women came forward with sexual harassment 
                                                                                                             
 
 17. Id. During an interview after Ailes’s alleged misconduct became public, Kelly argued 
that human resources, where employees report discrimination and harassment, should not 
report to the chief executive officer to avoid conflicts of interest. Id. 
 18. Callum Borchers, Book: Roger Ailes Has Been Soliciting Sex from Female Journalists 
Since the 1980s, WASH. POST: THE FIX (July 6, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/07/06/book-roger-ailes-has-been-soliciting-sex-from-female 
-journalists-since-the-1980s/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.033f10a4519e [https://perma.cc 
/G8NP-S8NY]. 
 19. Jim Rutenberg, Ben Protess & Emily Steel, Internal Inquiry Sealed the Fate of Roger 
Ailes at Fox, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/business 
/media/as-an-internal-inquiry-sinks-ailes-questions-about-fox-newss-fate.html?mtrref=www 
.google.com [https://perma.cc/DN3L-BPQR]. 
 20. Steel & Schmidt, supra note 9. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Erik Wemple, Rupert Murdoch Expertly Returns the Sexual Harassment Spotlight to 
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allegations against Roger Ailes, the former chief executive officer, in addition to 
complaints against other employees.26 Despite Murdoch’s statements, Twenty-First 
Century Fox has engaged in some potentially robust remediation efforts, as 
evidenced by the fact that it (i) dismissed Ailes and O’Reilly,27 (ii) entered into 
multiple settlements in summer 2016 regarding Ailes’s alleged misconduct,28 (iii) 
agreed to implement governance and compliance enhancements aimed at preventing 
sexual harassment,29 and (iv) expressed its commitment to preventing sexual 
harassment, racial discrimination, and retaliation in its Statement of Corporate 
Governance.30 
As demonstrated by this description, labeling the challenges faced by Twenty-
First Century Fox and Fox News as a failure in creating and maintaining an effective 
sexual harassment compliance program does not prompt one to see the depth and 
breadth of the potential deficiencies present. The root causes of the compliance 
failures at Twenty-First Century Fox and Fox News appear multifaceted. At a 
minimum, the causes may include (i) poor guidance and policy from Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, (ii) a need to adjust reporting lines within the firms, (iii) a more robust 
and responsive investigative process when confronted with allegations of sexual 
harassment, and (iv) improved leadership responses to allegations of sexual 
harassment and possible dysfunctional cultural realities within the firms. These 
multilayered, contributing causes become more apparent when one confronts the 
corporate misconduct using a process frame.  
While the emerging field of compliance is perceived by many as a narrow 
component of general corporate governance efforts,31 the sheer breadth and diversity 
of issues compliance programs must confront makes implementing effective 
compliance programs an intensely challenging endeavor.32 Today’s organizations are 
responsible for ensuring proper compliance in many different areas. Whether it is 
General Motors’s failure to properly address a faulty ignition switch or Wells Fargo’s 
decision to ignore fraudulently opened accounts—one common challenge 
                                                                                                             
 
Fox News, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik 
-wemple/wp/2017/12/16/rupert-murdoch-expertly-returns-the-sexual-harassment-spotlight 
-to-fox-news/?utm_term=.eab74cecd1ad [https://perma.cc/X59P-LPWD]. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Steel & Schmidt, supra note 9. 
 28. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Compromise, and Release at 3, City of 
Monroe Emps.’ Ret. Sys. ex rel. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. v. Murdoch, No. 2017-0833 
-AGB (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2017). This agreement as well as the subsequent non-monetary relief 
agreement were approved by the court on February 9, 2018. Jeff Montgomery, Fox’s 
‘Unusual’ $90M Scandal Deal Gets Chancery’s OK, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2018, 7:11 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1011154/fox-s-unusual-90m-scandal-deal-gets-chancery-s 
-ok [https://perma.cc/J4M9-FWUK]. 
 29. Non-Monetary Relief, supra note 10. 
 30. Id. at 2. 
 31. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An 
Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2014). But see Sean 
J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075 
(2016) (arguing that compliance does not fit within traditional models of corporate governance). 
 32. See Eric C. Chaffee, Creating Compliance: Exploring a Maturing Industry, 48 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 429, 430–31 (2017). 
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confronting modern organizations is how to appropriately assess and resolve 
compliance questions. As a result, misconduct by and within organizations continues 
to be a topic of significance for courts, regulators, prosecutors, and the individuals 
affected or harmed, which, in turn, makes the field of compliance of great societal 
import.33 Yet despite its recognized importance, significant compliance failures 
persist. 
Because compliance failures continue to occur, scholars, governmental actors, 
and industry leaders are constantly proposing, implementing, and questioning 
strategies aimed at improving organizations’ compliance programs. For example, 
legal scholarship has discussed the importance of focusing on cultures of 
compliance,34 the need for robust incentives from governmental actors,35 and the 
propriety of permitting governmental actors to dictate corporate governance 
reforms.36 Additionally, governmental actors are constantly experimenting with 
methods for encouraging more compliant behavior by organizations, as evidenced 
by the publication of recent guides on compliance programs37 and the Department of 
Justice’s (DOJ) adoption of a pilot program meant to motivate self-disclosure and 
cooperation by organizations.38 Similarly, industry leaders, such as the Association 
                                                                                                             
 
 33. See Cunningham, supra note 31, at 14 (explaining that the roots of compliance are 
anchored in the intensification of organizational criminal liability). 
 34. Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933 (2017). 
 35. Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 
(2017). 
 36. See Renee M. Jones & Michelle Welsh, Toward a Public Enforcement Model for 
Directors’ Duty of Oversight, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 343 (2012) (arguing in favor of a 
public enforcement model for the fiduciary duties of corporate directors). Compare 
Cunningham, supra note 31 (arguing that prosecutors should invest in corporate governance 
by contemplating it at the outset and articulating rationales for changes), and Griffith, supra 
note 31 (arguing for a more limited governmental role in designing corporate governance 
mechanisms), with Brandon L. Garrett, Rehabilitating Corporations, 66 FLA. L. REV. F. 1 
(2014) (responding to Cunningham’s argument). 
 37. See, e.g., William H. Jordan, Edward T. Kang & Jason D. Popp, Government & 
Internal Investigations Advisory: DOJ Releases Guidance on Compliance Programs, ALSTON 
& BIRD (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.alston.com/en/insights/publications/2017/03/doj 
-releases-guidance-on-compliance-programs [https://perma.cc/8JMB-5MQH] (discussing a 
publication from DOJ Fraud explaining how it measures compliance programs and providing 
information meant to help shape compliance policies); OIG Publishes Compliance Program 
Effectiveness Guide, ARNALL GOLDEN GREGORY (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.agg.com 
/Compliance-Program-Effectiveness-Guide-Published-by-OIG-04-25-2017 [https://perma.cc 
/8QL2-J38T] (discussing document issued by the Health and Human Services Office of the 
Inspector General on how to measure a compliance program’s effectiveness). 
 38. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division Launches New FCPA Pilot 
Program (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/criminal-division 
-launches-new-fcpa-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/2EA8-PUQB] (discussing the new DOJ 
Pilot Program, which provides significant mitigation credit and, in some instances, a 
declination to prosecute for companies confronting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
violation); see also Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks 
at 34th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2017), https:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th 
-international-conference-foreign [https://perma.cc/7TWS-FKFA] (some elements of the pilot 
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of Corporate Counsel, often publish guidance and best practices aimed at assisting 
organizations in their compliance efforts.39 Finally, the American Law Institute has 
brought together a variety of constituencies in an effort to provide “a set of 
recommended standards and best practices on the law of compliance and risk 
management.”40 
This Article contributes to the effort to improve compliance within organizations 
by proposing a new method for evaluating compliance failures that focuses on the 
discrete stages that make up the compliance process—prevention, detection, 
investigation, and remediation. Importantly, the compliance process outlined is 
applicable even when an organization has previously failed to demonstrate a robust 
commitment to creating a culture of compliance. Additionally, because the proposed 
compliance process frame may be utilized across regulatory areas and corporate 
forms, this Article helps to cement the field of compliance as a discrete area of study.  
Part I of this Article discusses the origins of the “effective compliance program” 
mandate and its commonly accepted limitations. Part II sets forth the four stages 
within a compliance process in an effort to provide a new framework for evaluating 
compliance failures. Currently, organizations that experience a compliance failure 
enter into a relatively broad inquiry focused on why their compliance program failed. 
This Article, however, argues that firms facing complex compliance failures may 
benefit from instead asking where within the compliance process did failure or 
failures occur. Part III draws on insights from the fields of cognitive psychology, 
behavioral economics, and behavioral ethics and argues that by assessing compliance 
failures through the process frame proposed by this Article, organizations will be 
able to better assess and understand the root cause of the breakdowns in their 
compliance programs.41 Once the root cause, or causes, of a compliance failure is 
understood, an organization will be better equipped to take appropriate measures 
aimed at ensuring long-term change. Part IV addresses benefits and potential 
concerns raised by the Article’s proposed framework. 
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I. THE (ELUSIVE) EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM  
Establishing an effective Compliance and Ethics Program (“Program”) has 
become a necessity to protect any highly regulated organization. 
– Association of Corporate Counsel42 
 
Organizations accept the need to establish an effective compliance and ethics 
program as a relatively uncontroversial reality. Thus, organizations understand that 
they and their agents must adhere to legal and regulatory requirements, industry 
practices, and the organization’s own internal policies and norms. This current 
understanding of compliance has evolved, in part, due to (i) an increase in regulatory 
requirements associated with a more complex administrative state, (ii) the addition 
of duty of care obligations for boards of directors and other corporate managers, and 
(iii) the increasing nature of governmental actors to pursue organizational criminal 
liability.43  
This Part begins by describing some of the rules, standards, and mandates that 
require firms to implement compliance programs. The Part then explains how a 
variety of incentives from enforcement agencies and prosecutors also exist to 
encourage organizations to adopt compliance programs that are effective, despite 
being imperfect. The Part concludes by outlining why perfect compliance would lead 
to an inefficient amount of self-policing and, therefore, is generally not pursued.  
A. Rules, Standards & Mandates 
The field of compliance, like many areas of the law, consists of a mix of bright-
line rules and less precise standards. The mix of rules and standards work together 
to establish the minimum levels of conduct firms must adopt to ensure that they have 
created effective compliance programs. If an organization does not meet these rules 
and standards, it becomes subject to certain consequences. 
For example, the United States requires “truthful declarations to U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection,” which allows “[c]ustoms officers . . . to scrutinize cultural 
property . . . and prevent the inappropriate entry of such property.”44 This is a bright-
line rule with which, in theory, compliance should be relatively easy. In addition to 
this bright-line rule, there are industry standards governing the sale and trade of 
certain antiquities, which can be more complicated to implement into a compliance 
program. For example, experts in the antiquities field know that “the acquisition of 
                                                                                                             
 
 42. Williford & Small, supra note 39.  
 43. Chaffee, supra note 32, at 429–30; see also Cunningham, supra note 31, at 14. This 
Part does not include a discussion on the responsibilities of board of directors for compliance 
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 44. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United 
States Files Civil Action to Forfeit Thousands of Ancient Iraqi Artifacts Imported by Hobby 
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2019] THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS  213 
 
cultural property likely from Iraq, including cuneiform tablets and cylinder seals, 
carries a risk that such objects may have been [improperly] looted from 
archaeological sites in Iraq.”45 Thus, businesses dealing in antiquities should ensure 
that (i) their customs declarations are truthful and honest and (ii) their compliance 
program has policies in place that govern how to properly handle antiquities from 
Iraq and other countries prone to antiquity theft. 
In 2017, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (“Hobby Lobby”) entered into a settlement 
with the U.S. government because it violated the operative rules and standards 
controlling the acquisition of certain antiquities, including cuneiform tablets—clay 
tablets with an ancient system of writing “that was used in ancient Mesopotamia 
thousands of years ago.”46 It improperly shipped cultural artifacts into the United 
States with falsified records regarding the artifacts’ country of origin and labeled the 
contents of the shipments as “ceramic tiles.”47 Hobby Lobby engaged in these illegal 
activities despite having received warnings from “an expert on cultural property law” 
that Hobby Lobby itself retained.48 Thus, Hobby Lobby failed to have an effective 
ethics and compliance program as it relates to the acquisition of antiquities.  
The consequence of Hobby Lobby’s compliance failure is that it was forced to 
forfeit many of the antiquities “and an additional sum of $3 million” to resolve a civil 
action brought against it by the United States.49 Hobby Lobby also “agreed to adopt 
internal policies and procedures governing its importation and purchase of cultural 
property, provide appropriate training to its personnel, hire qualified outside customs 
counsel and customs brokers, and submit quarterly reports to the government on any 
cultural property acquisitions for the next eighteen months.”50 In short, Hobby Lobby 
was required to create an ethics and compliance program with respect to the purchase 
of antiquities. Thus, in addition to having to comply with the bright-line rule and 
standards issued by the government, Hobby Lobby now also has a mandate, in the 
form of a civil settlement agreement with the government that requires Hobby Lobby 
to create a compliance program that addresses the purchase of antiquities.  
The mandate to adopt certain compliance programs can come, as it did in the case 
of Hobby Lobby, through a settlement agreement, but mandates are also sometimes 
found directly within statutory or regulatory requirements. For example, the Bank 
Secrecy Act requires banks to adopt compliance programs that include “[i]nternal 
policies, procedures, and controls,” as well as the “[d]esignation of a compliance 
officer” and “[o]ngoing employee training programs.”51 As such, an organization 
subject to the Bank Secrecy Act and its corresponding regulations has a mandate to 
adopt an ex ante ethics and compliance program. However, at the same time 
government actors and scholars recognize that compliance programs must be tailored 
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to the specific firm implementing a compliance program because the compliance 
needs of each organization will be different.52 
Thus, there are a variety of rules, standards, and mandates in place that amount to 
requirements that organizations develop compliance programs to address potential 
misconduct. In addition to these measures, prosecutors and regulators engage in a 
variety of efforts to incentivize firms to create effective ethics and compliance 
programs. 
B. Enforcement Incentives 
Despite the existence of rules, standards, and mandates that require organizations 
to engage in efforts to adopt effective ethics and compliance programs, compliance 
failures have continued to occur. As a result, governmental actors also utilize a 
variety of enforcement incentives to encourage firms to curb misconduct within their 
ranks.53 Indeed, it has long been understood and well documented throughout law 
and economics literature that “governments that want to effectively deter corporate 
crime should provide firms with strong incentives to undertake corporate policing.”54 
This is key because governmental actors have a very limited ability to detect 
misconduct within private organizations and must rely on organizations to police 
their own members. Thus, regulators and prosecutors have adopted a range of 
policies and enforcement norms that serve as incentives for organizations to monitor 
their members in an effort to deter and prevent corporate misconduct.  
One example of a strong set of incentives utilized by regulators and prosecutors 
comes from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which contains a section entitled 
“Effective Compliance and Ethics Program.” That section requires organizations to 
“exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct.”55 This provision is 
part of what has become known as the Organizational Guidelines, which provide 
mechanisms for sanctioning corporations for criminal misconduct.56 Specifically, the 
Organizational Guidelines allow organizations to be “fined, sentenced to 
                                                                                                             
 
 52. See, e.g., OFAC FAQs: Sanctions Compliance, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https:// 
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probation . . . ordered to make restitution . . . [required to] issue public notices of 
conviction . . . and exposed to applicable forfeiture statutes.”57 
Interestingly, the Organizational Guidelines, while technically applicable only to 
criminal enforcement actions, have become an important tool that prosecutors and 
regulators utilize to encourage corporations engaged in misconduct to settle claims 
through the use of civil enforcement actions.58 The threat of criminal sanction under 
the Organizational Guidelines has proven an effective mechanism for governmental 
enforcement authorities to incentivize corporations to address and remediate 
misconduct.  
For example, when General Motors’s ignition switch scandal came to light, it 
became clear that the company’s decision to ignore the faulty ignition switches 
resulted in the injury and, in some cases, death of dozens of individuals.59 Despite 
the company’s decision to ignore the problem for several years, the government 
allowed General Motors to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement, a civil 
agreement, to resolve the corporate misconduct.60 The agreement established that the 
government would defer bringing criminal charges for three years if General Motors 
agreed to undertake certain remediation efforts.61 Additionally, General Motors 
agreed to have an independent monitor “review and assess policies, practices, and 
procedures relating to [General Motors’s] safety-related public statements, sharing 
of engineering data, and recall processes.”62 General Motors also agreed to forfeit 
$900 million. At the conclusion of the three-year period, if General Motors performs 
as expected under the deferred prosecution agreement, then the criminal charges 
against it will be dismissed in their entirety.63 
As demonstrated by this example, the government is able to utilize a variety of 
enforcement incentives to motivate private firms to engage in specific behavior.64 
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When the government’s enforcement incentives are viewed in tandem with the pre-
existing rules, standards, and mandates that require organizations to adopt ethics and 
compliance programs, one might think that organizations would engage in a robust 
effort to ensure perfect compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. In 
actuality, however, some compliance failures are not only expected, they are 
accepted as necessary realities. 
C. Imperfect Compliance   
Despite the focus by regulators and prosecutors on the importance of developing 
an effective compliance program, it is commonly understood that it would be 
inefficient for firms to strive to obtain “perfect” compliance.65 Much of this 
understanding comes from law and economics scholarship, which two decades ago 
outlined the argument against a mandate for firms to achieve perfect compliance with 
legal and regulatory demands.66  
Organizations are sanctioned for misconduct, but the actual offenders are an 
organization’s agents—the organization’s employees or members.67 Thus, 
organizations are sanctioned not because they themselves commit crime, but because 
they are held vicariously liable for the actions of their agents.68 The question debated 
at the time was whether organizations should be held to a strict vicarious liability 
standard, or something more malleable:  
[Vicarious liability] is not only the most familiar regime of corporate 
liability, but also is the most plausible one whenever agents only act in 
the best interests of their principals––either because they share these 
interests or because they do as they are told. In this situation, the firm’s 
agents are logically compelled to avoid misbehavior if the firm must 
internalize its costs. But when this condition does not hold––when the 
firm has different interests from its agents and cannot control them 
costlessly––then simple vicarious liability may no longer be the preferred 
corporate incentive regime. In that case, the state cannot deter 
misconduct simply by setting liability high enough to ensure that firms 
cannot profit from it. 
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 68. There are scholars who have advocated for a different method of attributing liability 
to organizations for the conduct of their agents. For example, one might limit a finding of 
organizational misconduct to circumstances where the organization’s agent acted “primarily 
with the intent to benefit the firm.” Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal 
Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 473–75 (2006) (“[C]ommon law courts . . . imported respondeat 
superior liability from tort law into the criminal law . . . without serious theoretical analysis”). 
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 Instead, the firm must be induced to take direct action to deter agents 
from committing wrongs, including measures to prevent misconduct and 
policing measures to detect and sanction it.69 
The latter path was chosen, which resulted in prosecutors and enforcement agents 
tolerating certain amounts of noncompliance with legal and regulatory requirements. 
In part, this is because “strict liability enforcement, while the best regime for 
‘inducing firms to sanction culpable agents,’ ‘may actually deter firms from 
monitoring, investigating, or reporting’ corporate misconduct.”70 
Recognizing this, in 2016 the DOJ Fraud Section (“DOJ Fraud”) initiated a pilot 
program that allows corporations to reduce the sanction they would otherwise face 
for violations under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which prohibits 
bribery of foreign officials.71 To receive the lesser sanction, companies must 
“voluntarily disclose misconduct, fully cooperate [with the DOJ], and timely and 
appropriately remediate” the misconduct surrounding the FCPA violation.72 As a 
result of the program, DOJ Fraud has issued several “declinations” to prosecute.73 
One such declination was entered into between DOJ Fraud and Linde North America 
Inc. and Linde Gas North America LLC (collectively, “Linde”).74 From November 
2006 to December 2009, Linde “made corrupt payments to high-level officials at the 
National High Technology Center (‘NHTC’) of the Republic of Georgia (‘Georgia’), 
a 100% state-owned and -controlled entity” in an effort to receive the officials’ 
assistance in obtaining certain contracts related to the production of boron gas.75  
Sanctions for FCPA violations vary, but previous empirical research suggests “the 
sanction imposed in an FCPA action increases with the size of bribe, the profit related 
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to the bribe, [and] the amount of business affected by the bribe.”76 This possible 
emphasis on correlating the seriousness of the offense with the sanction might be 
consistent with attempting to adopt a near strict liability standard for corporations 
engaged in FCPA violations. In contrast, granting a declination in the face of 
multiyear, widespread bribery of multiple foreign officials would seem inapposite 
with the goal of incentivizing firms to prevent misconduct within their ranks. The 
government, however, has recognized that there are benefits to allowing for 
imperfect compliance. In the case of Linde, the declination letter explained that 
leniency was warranted because of: 
(1) Linde’s timely, voluntary self-disclosure of the matter; (2) the 
thorough, comprehensive and proactive investigation undertaken by 
Linde; (3) Linde’s full cooperation in this matter (including its provision 
of all known relevant facts about the individuals involved in or 
responsible for the misconduct) and its agreement to continue to 
cooperate in any ongoing investigations of individuals; (4) Linde’s 
agreement to disgorge the profits . . . and forfeit to the United States the 
corrupt proceeds . . . ; (5) the steps Linde has taken and continues to take 
to enhance its compliance program and its internal accounting controls; 
and (6) Linde’s full remediation (including terminating and/or taking 
disciplinary action against the employees involved in the  
misconduct . . . ).77 
DOJ Fraud’s declination program and policy is just one of many ways in which 
the government acknowledges that there are practical reasons to provide strong 
incentives for firms to prevent and detect misconduct, while also acknowledging that 
perfect compliance is an imprudent goal. 
Thus, the admonition to enact an effective compliance program is not an effort 
aimed at achieving perfect compliance. Instead, firms are tasked with engaging in 
good faith efforts at ensuring that their members and employees engage in activity 
that is in accordance with legal and regulatory requirements.  
* * * *  
As highlighted by this Part, prudent organizations will implement ethics and 
compliance programs in areas where they are subject to certain legal or regulatory 
requirements or strong sets of mandates or potential sanctions. They are not, 
however, expected to achieve perfect compliance because such a requirement might 
have the unintended consequence of actually diminishing firms’ efforts to pursue 
effective compliance programs. As a result, the quest for an effective compliance 
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program is something of a moving target and a seemingly elusive goal. Organizations 
know they must implement a compliance program, but failure within these programs 
is persistent. These failures have led firms to question continuously how they can 
craft a more effective compliance program that is more likely to deter misconduct.  
II. THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS 
“Process” “a series of actions or operations conducing to an end.”78 
 
As explained in Part I, governmental actors have long emphasized the importance 
for firms to design effective ethics and compliance programs. Industry officials have 
responded in kind by creating compliance programs within their organizations that 
are often headed by chief compliance officers79 and sometimes include hundreds, if 
not thousands, of compliance personnel.80 Yet, these same industry leaders and 
enforcement authorities are asked each and every day to evaluate the cause of 
compliance failures. To date, when organizations have undertaken these sorts of 
inquiries, they have focused almost entirely on why the compliance program failed. 
The presumption behind that inquiry, however, fails to prompt decision-makers 
within firms to look beyond the surface cause or causes of the identified corporate 
misconduct.  
This Article suggests a new method of evaluating compliance failures by asking 
at what stage in the compliance process did the failure or failures occur. Reframing 
the inquiry when compliance failures occur from a generalized discussion about a 
firm’s compliance program to a more specific discussion that references particular 
stages within the compliance process may assist in creating, implementing, and 
modifying compliance programs in a more effective manner.81 This Part discusses 
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each stage undertaken within the compliance process—prevention, detection, 
investigation, and remediation—in turn.82  
Before turning to these stages, however, it is important to remember that 
misconduct within organizations occurs in a variety of ways and in many different 
contexts. And some contexts suggest that the organization has no desire to adopt 
policies or programs that are compliant with legal and regulatory requirements. There 
are many examples of significant organizational misconduct where this Article’s 
framework will not be of significant use because the organization is not committed 
or interested in improving its compliance program.83 As such, this Article’s 
framework will be most helpful for (i) organizations that are committed to ferreting 
out compliance failures and (ii) regulators or prosecutors engaged in robust 
investigations of corporate misconduct.  
Additionally, in many instances the compliance process is effectively and 
routinely performed in its entirety by one person, department, or external consultant. 
This Article is not suggesting that compliance officers should start evaluating each 
and every decision as a stage in a compliance process. For relatively simple 
compliance failures, it may not be necessary for the firm to pay careful attention to 
what compliance stage it is in. When, however, the compliance failure is more 
significant, it becomes more important that the compliance stage is carefully 
considered when engaging in compliance activities.  
A. Prevention 
The stage of prevention involves actions undertaken to prevent compliance 
failures from occurring within a firm. In some instances, that prevention happens by 
refusing to endorse certain information—like when an auditor refuses to certify 
certain financial statements because they fail to meet regulatory or industry 
standards.84 In other instances, prevention involves setting up systems and policies 
that will stop conduct from occurring within the firm that would violate legal 
mandates.85  
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http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772 [https://perma.cc/3GEU-AKCW]. 
 84. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning 
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To clarify, prevention does not mean perfection, as it is commonly accepted by 
scholars, regulators, and industry officials that “perfect” compliance is not the 
ultimate goal of the compliance program.86 Instead, what is expected is that firms 
take reasonable efforts to create systems and policies that will prevent the types of 
risks that the firm might reasonably be contemplated to confront. It is certainly true 
that all compliance failures have some element of a “prevention” failure, because if 
a compliance failure occurred within a firm, it was not prevented. For purposes of 
this Section, however, the prevention stage is concerned with instances of corporate 
misconduct where the primary compliance failure appears to have been one of 
prevention. In other words, the firm failed to appropriately conceive of its 
responsibilities associated with prevention and as a result, wrongdoing occurred. 
For example, the Enron scandal appears, at core, to be a failure of prevention. 
Enron Corporation (“Enron”) “was almost universally considered one of the 
country’s most innovative companies” in the late 1990s.87 Enron bought and sold 
“gas and electricity futures,” but it also “created whole new markets for such oddball 
‘commodities’ as broadcast time for advertisers, weather futures, and Internet 
bandwidth.”88 At its most successful, Enron was worth approximately $70 billion, 
but the value of the firm diminished significantly when it admitted to misstating its 
income and “that its equity value was a couple of billion dollars less than its balance 
sheet said.”89 The prevention failure was twofold. First, the external actor meant to 
withhold its certification or approval of certain activities—Arthur Andersen LLP 
—failed to do so.90 Arthur Andersen’s failure resulted in Enron engaging in 
accounting practices that improperly misstated the true value of the firm and 
ultimately led to Enron’s total collapse. Second, Enron’s board of directors approved 
a series of transactions fraught with serious, atypical conflicts of interest, which 
enriched Enron officials, including its chief financial officer.91 The results of Enron’s 
misconduct were devastating and vast, but at its core, the compliance failure was one 
of a lack of prevention. 
The importance of preventing misconduct within firms is not a new phenomenon. 
Indeed, one of the seminal cases on fiduciary duties and arguably one of the founding 
cases in modern compliance law—Caremark—began with a prevention failure.92 In 
Caremark, the board of directors explicitly sought the guidance of lawyers and 
accountants regarding the propriety of making certain payments to physicians, but it 
was given poor advice from both sets of gatekeepers, which resulted in the 
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company’s indictment as well as other significant sanctions levied by the Department 
of Health & Human Services and DOJ.93  
Thus, the idea that compliance officials are responsible for preventing misconduct 
within their respective organizations is not at all new. Yet when organizations are 
given an admonition to construct or fix their internal compliance programs, the 
importance of considering the particular stage of prevention might get lost within 
broader discussions about the more general compliance program. By honing in on 
the various stages within the compliance process, officials charged with assessing 
compliance failures may be more likely to assess prevention activities in a more 
direct and complete manner. 
B. Detection 
The stage of detection involves an organization’s policies aimed at detecting 
misconduct, risks, or errors within its ranks. Detection is particularly complex 
because the organization must detect when an agent acts outside the parameters of 
internal policies set up as part of the company’s preventive efforts,94 but it must also 
detect potential risks that might result in harm to third parties or itself.95 
For example, the primary cause of the General Motors ignition switch scandal 
appears to have been a detection failure. General Motors is a global automotive 
company headquartered in Detroit, Michigan.96 It currently has over 180,000 
employees on five continents and is a storied American corporation.97 In 2014, news 
of a potentially deadly defect in the functioning of ignition switches of certain 
General Motors’s vehicles came to light.98 An investigation ensued, which 
determined that while engineers had identified problems with the ignition switch as 
early as 2002, the full scope of the defect was not detected. Indeed:  
[S]ophisticated engineers with responsibility to provide customers with 
safe and reliable automobiles – did not understand one of the most 
fundamental consequences of the switch failing and the car stalling: the 
airbags would not deploy. The failure of the switch meant that drivers 
were without airbag protection at the time they needed it most. This 
failure, combined with others . . . led to devastating consequences.99 
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 94. For example, the Bank Secrecy Act requires firms to implement specific policies 
aimed at stopping money-laundering activity. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012) (explaining that 
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As a result of the failure to understand the full ramifications of the defect, General 
Motors improperly classified the ignition switch defect as one of “customer 
convenience” instead of as a “safety” issue.100 This misclassification resulted in the 
belief that fixing the ignition switch defect was a low-priority concern, which 
resulted in General Motors’s failure to comply with regulatory requirements, as well 
as related industry practice, regarding the recall of unsafe automobile components.101 
Additionally, subsequent committees charged with considering the implementation 
of a fix for the ignition switch also failed to reclassify the problem as a safety issue.102 
Indeed, a group “charged with identifying and remedying safety issues, made the 
same mistake; it opened and closed an investigation in 2005 in the span of a month, 
finding no safety issue to be remedied.”103 Yet in 2007, both a Wisconsin Safety 
Patrol trooper and an Indiana University research team correctly detected the 
connection between the faulty ignition switch and the nondeployment of airbags.104 
Finally, a group of internal lawyers at General Motors who were charged with using 
settlement data to generate settlement forecasts and detect trends indicating safety 
issues abdicated this responsibility.105  
Like prevention, the importance of detecting potential misconduct, risks, or errors 
is well-settled within corporate law jurisprudence. For example, in Stone v. Ritter,106 
the bank adopted an anti-money laundering program, but the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network determined that the program was 
deficient because the bank had “a fragmented program in which areas of the Bank 
had information on suspicious activity that was never communicated to those 
responsible for Bank Secrecy Act compliance.”107 As such, while the bank formally 
detected the potential misconduct, it failed to structure the program in a manner that 
allowed the people responsible for evaluating the behavior to detect it. 
Again, the idea that compliance officials are responsible for detecting compliance 
failures within their respective organizations is not novel. Indeed, the Organizational 
Guidelines specifically instruct organizations on the importance of detecting 
misconduct within their ranks.108 But it is not clear that organizations make a 
concerted effort to specifically evaluate the role a detection failure may have 
contributed to the general failure within its compliance program. 
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C. Investigation 
The stage of investigation involves a firm’s policies and practices targeted at 
determining the existence of and, if relevant, scope of the compliance failure. 
Investigation requires discovering the facts surrounding the failure, so that decision-
makers at the firm are equipped with a sufficient amount of knowledge to make 
informed decisions about the appropriate next steps.109 The investigative stage is 
particularly tricky because it inevitably starts with the detection stage and often 
continues on after the firm has begun its remediation efforts. The importance of the 
investigation stage, however, cannot be overstated, and even if completed in 
conjunction with detection or remediation, it is its own discrete stage within 
compliance efforts.110 And failures at the investigatory stage, just as with prevention 
and detection, can be devastating for firms. 
For example, the Wells Fargo fake account scandal appears to have been 
exacerbated in large part due to deliberate actions taken by bank officials to block a 
thorough and proper investigation of the inappropriate conduct within the firm.111 
Wells Fargo provides “diversified financial services,” which include a community 
bank division that provides traditional banking services to consumers and small 
businesses.112 “From 2011 to mid-2016 – but possibly going back to 2009 or before 
– Wells [Community Bank] employees created more than 1.5 million unauthorized 
deposit accounts and issued more than 500,000 unauthorized credit card applications. 
These accounts racked up $2.6 million in fees for the bank.”113 A subsequent 
investigation by the board of directors for the bank identified failures with the bank’s 
investigative function. First, it determined that “Community Bank leadership resisted 
and impeded outside scrutiny or oversight and, when forced to report, minimized the 
scale and nature of the problem.”114 Second, it determined that the former chief 
executive officer “was too slow to investigate or critically challenge sales practices 
in the Community Bank.”115 In addition to these findings in the board’s report, 
reporting indicates that Wells Fargo employees were fired after reporting to their 
supervisors regarding the fraudulent behavior within the Community Bank.116 If 
                                                                                                             
 
 109. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR COMPANIES AND THEIR 
COUNSEL IN CONDUCTING INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 2 (2008). 
 110. See id. at 22 (discussing the use of internal investigation work product to assist in 
remediation needs and efforts). 
 111. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS OF THE BOARD OF WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, SALES 
PRACTICES INVESTIGATION REPORT (2017) [hereinafter WELLS FARGO REPORT]. 
 112. History of Wells Fargo, WELLS FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/about 
/corporate/history [https://perma.cc/LK7R-RFAT]; see also Wayne Thompson, Wells Fargo 
Unveils Organizational Changes in Its Community Bank, WELLS FARGO (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://stories.wf.com/wells-fargo-unveils-organizational-changes-community-bank [https:// 
perma.cc/ZCX8-K2WC]. 
 113. The Wells Fargo Fake Account Scandal: A Timeline, FORBES, https://www.forbes 
.com/pictures/ejhj45fjij/two-million-phony-accoun/#4f1d8e7a6f24 [https://perma.cc/8JSY 
-TSYE].  
 114. WELLS FARGO REPORT, supra note 111, at Overview. 
 115. Id.  
 116. See Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Whistle-Blower Wins $5.4 Million and His Job Back, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/business/04-wells-fargo 
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Wells Fargo had acted on the misconduct that was detected within its ranks and 
properly investigated the allegations, it could have, at a minimum, stopped the 
misconduct at an earlier date. Instead, officials at the firm disregarded the 
information they received and failed to trigger the investigative stage within the 
compliance process. 
Again, like prevention and detection, the importance of utilizing appropriate 
investigative methods when confronting potential firm misconduct is commonly 
accepted. For example, in Auerbach v. Bennett,117 the court evaluated whether a 
board engaged in an appropriate investigation of misconduct within a corporation. 
The court explained that “[a]s to the methodologies and procedures best suited to the 
conduct of an investigation of facts and the determination of legal liability, the courts 
are well equipped by long and continuing experience and practice to make 
determinations.”118 It ultimately determined that the board’s actions were proper and 
noted that “[t]he selection of appropriate investigative methods must always turn on 
the nature and characteristics of the particular subject being investigated.”119 
The importance of a robust investigation in the face of a compliance failure has 
long been an important component of organizational compliance efforts. There are 
numerous documents outlining the best industry practices for conducting internal 
investigations.120 The idea, however, that the investigation itself might fail or be 
deficient in some manner is not typically considered. The assumption is that the 
investigation will present a solution, not serve as the impetus of the compliance 
failure. Yet by purposefully considering whether the investigation itself contributed 
to the compliance challenges faced by the organization, compliance officials may 
develop a better understanding regarding the root cause of the compliance failures 
facing their organizations.  
D. Remediation 
The stage of remediation involves a firm’s strategies for responding to and 
recovering from the misconduct uncovered at the detection and investigation stages. 
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The remediation stage provides firms an opportunity to expressly confront the 
misconduct that occurred in a manner targeted at addressing the compliance failure 
completely and thoroughly. In some instances a remediation effort may involve 
compensating victims for a harm caused as part of a mandate from a government 
regulator,121 and in other instances it may require developing a robust set of policies 
and procedures targeted to prevent similar misconduct in the future in an effort to 
comply with the Organizational Guidelines.122 Regardless of the particular tasks that 
are required for the remediation effort, it is an important last step in a firm’s effort to 
address misconduct in its ranks. 
For example, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (“Credit Suisse”) failed to 
address deficiencies in its anti-money laundering compliance program and, as a 
result, was fined $16.5 million by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA) in December 2016.123 While a number of factors ultimately led to the fine, 
one of the concerns was Credit Suisse’s failure to properly remediate misconduct. 
Specifically, the Accept, Waiver, and Consent settlement between Credit Suisse and 
FINRA explained that in December 2013, a “consulting firm issued a detailed report 
identifying numerous inadequacies in the firm’s implementation” of an anti-money 
laundering automated system.124 Credit Suisse “developed a plan to fully remediate 
the issues identified by the consultant, and in 2015 retained additional consultants to 
help improve the system, [but] it initially failed to devote adequate resources and 
funding to resolve the issues identified by the consulting firm[s] in an adequately 
timely fashion.”125 
The importance of remediation efforts, like prevention, detection, and 
investigation, continues to be emphasized by enforcement authorities. For example, 
in 2016, then DOJ Fraud Section Chief Andrew Weissmann commented that 
“companies are not focused enough on the remediation that should follow findings 
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of misconduct.”126 Indeed, he stressed that based on the comparative falloff in 
attention given to matters of remediation, he expects for the government to use 
formal tools to encourage more systematic regulation like the use of corporate 
monitors—independent, private outsiders—to oversee remediation efforts within 
firms.127 
A failure of a remediation effort is particularly susceptible to being overlooked as 
a root cause of an organization’s compliance failures. A firm cannot have a 
remediation effort unless there was a failure at one of the three preceding stages 
within compliance efforts. As such, it may be easy for organizations to focus their 
attention on issues of prevention, detection, and investigation at the expense of a 
robust analysis regarding the organization’s efforts to remediate misconduct. Yet 
examples like Credit Suisse and Fox News demonstrate the importance of evaluating 
the relative success or failure of an organization’s remediation effort when 
attempting to ascertain the full scope and breadth of a compliance failure within the 
organization.  
* * * * 
Thus, the effective compliance program may be broken up into the four distinct 
stages of prevention, detection, investigation, and remediation.  
 
This Article is not arguing that these stages are always completed at a separate 
point of time. A competent compliance officer may engage in the detection and 
investigative processes at the same time and then go on to institute a remediation 
process that bleeds into the creation of prevention policies. This Article also is not 
arguing that misconduct typically only occurs within one stage or, as evidenced by 
the Fox News example, a compliance failure might encompass deficiencies within 
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all four stages of the compliance process. This Article argues that these are distinct 
tasks, and when these stages are considered discretely and independently, the root 
cause of compliance failures may be easier to identify and rectify.  
Thus, the upshot of this Article is that there is a class of compliance failures where 
utilizing the evaluative framework proposed above may be helpful in identifying the 
root cause of the failure and developing a plan for the future that will avoid similar 
misconduct. For firms engaged in a rather intense struggle to implement an effective 
compliance program in the midst of multiple compliance deficiencies, it may be 
helpful to conceive of the compliance challenge as having multiple, discrete 
components. 
III. REFRAMING THROUGH THE COMPLIANCE PROCESS 
As demonstrated above, scholars, regulators, and industry leaders have long 
considered strategies for addressing compliance failures. In doing so, they have 
mentioned the importance of certain aspects within the compliance process like 
prevention and remediation. They have not, however, suggested using these aspects 
as a method of framing the analytical assessment of compliance failures in a more 
systematic way. This Article—relying on insights from cognitive psychology, 
behavioral economics, and behavioral ethics—argues that changing the frame by 
which compliance failures are assessed may help to better determine the root cause 
of the breakdown within an organization’s compliance system.128  
Framing, as explained by cognitive psychologists and applied to decision-making 
models by scholars within the field of behavioral economics, can drastically change 
the manner in which people process information.129 This change can occur because 
“choices depend, in part, on the way in which problems are stated.”130 Thus, by 
restating the problem from “how or why did this compliance failure occur” to “at 
what stages within the compliance process did breakdowns occur,” those responsible 
for analyzing compliance failures within organizations might focus their inquiries in 
a more precise way.  
Root-cause analysis is a tool often employed by business professionals to 
determine why certain actions or phenomenon occurred within an organization or 
industry.131 In particular, root-cause analysis is meant to:  
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[A]nswer the following questions: (1) What happened? (What, exactly, 
was the ultimate outcome?); (2) Why did it happen? (What causal factors 
contributed to the outcome?); and (3) What can you do to prevent it from 
happening again? (What system changes can be put in place to anticipate 
and intervene in the errors that inevitably occur in human activities?).132 
Properly ascertaining the root cause of a compliance failure is important for those 
charged with creating, implementing, maintaining, and enforcing compliance norms 
and mandates. If the root cause of a compliance failure is mis- or only partially-
identified, the ability to prevent similar failures in the future is severely limited.  
This Part demonstrates how reframing the assessment of compliance failures 
through the four stages of compliance outlined in Part II—prevention, detection, 
investigation, and remediation—might assist industry leaders and policymakers in 
evaluating and identifying the root cause of certain compliance failures. To 
demonstrate the potential of utilizing the proposed process frame, this Part discusses 
four compliance efforts that were plagued by significant missteps. When these 
compliance activities are assessed under a process frame, new considerations are 
revealed.  
The first example comes from the Apple monitorship and suggests that part of 
what caused the difficult remediation effort was confusion regarding the proper role 
of the monitor and the appropriate scope of duties. The second example comes from 
a bank’s engagement of the Promontory Financial Group, LLC (“Promontory”) to 
assist it with a series of compliance failures, which resulted in a failure to apprehend 
when Promontory’s role with the company converted in a manner that required more 
independence. The third example demonstrates how the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC) misunderstood the expansive nature of its own consent order’s 
demands, which wasted millions of dollars and stalled remediation payments to 
homeowners. And the fourth example demonstrates how Baylor University lacked a 
true commitment to compliance with regulatory guidance, despite its statements to 
the contrary.  
A. Example 1: Role Confusion 
In 2013, a district court judge, in a civil action brought by DOJ Antitrust, found 
Apple to have engaged in improper collusive activity in the sale of e-books.133 The 
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court appointed a monitor to oversee Apple’s remediation efforts with respect to its 
antitrust compliance program.134 The Apple monitorship was, however, plagued with 
a variety of problems, which have been attributed to potential cronyism in the 
monitorship appointment,135 a lack of appropriate limitations regarding the 
appointment of monitors,136 and my own suggestion that the evolution and 
prevalence of modern-day monitors had muddied the understandings of the 
appropriate limitations for court-appointed monitors.137 There does, however, appear 
to be another account that reveals itself when one considers the difficulties 
surrounding the Apple monitorship utilizing a compliance process frame: instead of 
taking on the role of overseeing the remediation of Apple’s antitrust compliance 
program, the monitor attempted to take on a broader preventative task that included 
undertaking activities unrelated to Apple’s antitrust program. 
1. Difficulties with the Apple Monitorship 
The district court’s order requiring Apple to submit to a monitorship stated that 
the monitor was to “review and evaluate Apple’s existing internal antitrust 
compliance policies and procedures” and “to recommend to Apple changes to 
address any perceived deficiencies in those policies, procedures, and training.”138 
Apple was not pleased about the imposition of the monitor but upon reviewing the 
district court’s order did not initially file objections. This changed, however, when 
the monitor began to engage in activities broader than what Apple originally 
contemplated as appropriate under the court order.139 For example, the monitor 
sought to interview “Apple’s entire executive team and its entire board of directors,” 
even though many of these individuals had not been involved in antitrust matters.140 
The district court did not attempt to restrain the monitor’s behavior and instead 
seemed to approve of the monitor’s view that he needed to “crawl inside the 
company,” so as to ascertain Apple’s tone and culture at a very broad level.141 
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Eventually the Second Circuit reigned in the scope of the monitorship, but the 
damage was done.142 
As a result of the dispute regarding the appropriate scope of the monitor’s duties, 
a variety of consequences occurred. The monitorship and the district court were 
highly criticized.143 The relationship between the monitor and Apple became 
contentious and plagued with various rounds of litigation.144 Ultimately, the Second 
Circuit went so far as to criticize the monitor’s actions in a written opinion.145 As 
such, a rather typical, at least at the outset, remediation effort ended up being far 
from successful on a number of objective measures. 
2. The Apple Monitorship Under the Compliance Process Frame 
It is relatively simple—and correct—to look at the Apple monitorship and classify 
it as a remediation effort gone wrong. But the goal of the process frame is to utilize 
the stages to determine the root cause of why it went wrong. Determining the root 
cause requires an inquiry into the actions of the monitor, judge, government, and 
Apple to determine why the remediation effort was plagued by so many challenges.  
The facts demonstrate that the initial moment of tension between the monitor and 
Apple occurred when the monitor attempted to interview Apple’s entire executive 
team and board of directors, which included individuals who had no responsibility 
or interaction with antitrust policies or procedures.146 This initial dispute turned into 
a much larger battle regarding the appropriate scope of the monitor’s authority, with 
the monitor, government, and court taking a rather broad interpretation of the 
monitor’s authority and Apple insisting that the monitor was overstepping.147 
The activities the monitor engaged in that Apple complained about, however, did 
look unusual for a typical remediation effort. As explained in Part II:  
The stage of remediation involves a firm’s strategies for responding to 
and recovering from the misconduct uncovered at the detection and 
investigation stages. The remediation stage provides firms an 
opportunity to expressly confront the misconduct that occurred in a 
manner targeted at addressing the compliance failure completely and 
thoroughly.148  
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The Apple monitor, however, went beyond activity that was tied to remedying 
Apple’s antitrust misconduct and sought to address a much broader scope of conduct. 
Indeed, careful reflection suggests the monitor attempted to take on more of a 
prevention role. Instead of directly tying his activities to addressing the antitrust 
misconduct at Apple, the monitor engaged in activities that looked similar to what 
one might do if he or she were creating a compliance program from scratch. But the 
original court order had not contemplated the creation of a compliance program; it 
required modifications to the existing program—a much narrower task. 
This leads one to wonder why the monitor, with support from the district court 
judge and government attorneys, engaged in activities that were broader than what 
would be found in a typical remediation effort. In part, this might have been a result 
of what behavioral economics terms cognitive conservatism. “Once an impression is 
gained, it is insufficiently revised to reflect new information. There is a bias to the 
status quo. Especially in noisy information environments where observers have little 
time to think reflectively, the strong inclination is to construe data as normal rather 
than abnormal.”149 Once the monitor interpreted his role broadly, his view may have 
become entrenched despite the protestations of Apple. Indeed, Apple’s protests 
created a particularly “noisy” environment that resulted in multiple appeals to the 
Second Circuit and significant, critical news reports toward the monitor and district 
court. Thus, Apple’s objections may have inadvertently served to entrench further 
the view of the monitor, court, and government about the appropriateness of the 
monitor’s actions, allowing the tendency of cognitive conservativism to take hold. 
Therefore, the breakdowns associated with the Apple monitorship might properly 
be characterized as, at least in part, being caused by the monitor, court, and 
government’s failure to consider whether the monitor’s initial impression regarding 
his scope of authority was correct. Instead of reflecting on the appropriate boundaries 
and norms that should restrain a compliance actor engaged in a remediation effort, 
the monitor’s initial impression became the status quo view. The confusion is 
understandable in that remediation efforts may often bleed into prevention efforts, 
but the failure to recognize that they are discrete and distinct stages may have 
contributed to the conflicts between the parties in this case. 
If, however, Apple had framed its objections utilizing the process frame outlined 
in this Article or if the monitor, court, or government had been mindful that the 
monitorship was meant to be part of a remediation effort, the conflicts created by the 
monitor’s more expansive view of the appropriate boundaries for the monitorship 
may have been more apparent. Instead of viewing Apple’s objections as the protests 
of a recalcitrant bad actor, they may have been viewed as legitimate concerns 
regarding the appropriate scope of authority for an individual engaged in a 
remediation, as opposed to a prevention, effort. And instead of viewing his role 
expansively, the monitor may have been more likely to restrict his actions to those 
appropriate for a narrowly tailored remediation effort. 
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B. Example 2: Unidentified Role Conversion 
Promontory is “a leading strategy, risk management, and regulatory-compliance 
consulting firm focusing on the financial services industry.”150 It “help[s] entities 
understand and implement global and national financial services regulation.”151 
Ironically, Promontory, a firm charged with assisting firms facing compliance 
challenges, experienced its own compliance failure that resulted in significant 
sanctions, including a $15 million penalty.152 As described by the New York State 
Department of Financial Services, Promontory exercised “a lack of independent 
judgment in the preparation and submission of certain reports.”153 When one 
considers Promontory’s conduct under a compliance process frame, however, it 
looks as if the failure was more complicated. The root cause of Promontory’s lack of 
independent judgment appears related to its failure to identify a need to change the 
parameters of its relationship when it went from assisting a bank with detection 
efforts to assisting the bank and the regulator with a related investigation. 
1. Promontory’s Misconduct  
In 2009, Standard Chartered, a bank, hired Promontory to serve in what appeared 
to be a role meant to assist the bank in detecting certain types of misconduct.154 
Specifically, “Promontory contracted with the Bank’s counsel to provide ‘consulting 
services in connection with the identification and collection of historical transaction 
records relating to cross-border financial transactions.’”155 After Promontory 
completed its review, Standard Chartered “reported to various regulators, including 
the New York [Department of Financial Services] . . . that it had engaged in conduct 
related to the evasion of U.S. sanctions.”156 It appears, therefore, that Promontory 
properly assisted the bank in detecting instances of misconduct and the bank then, 
again properly, reported the detected misconduct to the appropriate regulator.  
In April 2010, Standard Chartered again engaged Promontory “to identify, collect 
and review historical transaction records ‘with certain countries or certain Specially 
Designated Nationals (“SDNs”) subject to sanctions’ administered by” the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.157 “As part of the 
engagement, Promontory produced a number of reports and made various 
presentations to the Bank and government authorities . . . . These reports included 
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interim reports throughout 2010, final reports in January and March of 2011, and 
updates to those final reports in October 2011.”158 This second engagement, known 
as “Project Green,” involved efforts to investigate the full scope of the bank’s 
misconduct and is where problems with Promontory’s conduct occurred.159  
When Promontory took on the Project Green engagement, it held itself out to be 
independent from Standard Chartered, and as part of the engagement, it provided 
formal and regular reports to the New York Department of Financial Services. The 
regulator, in turn, relied “upon the work conducted and presented by Promontory to 
identify the scope of the Bank’s improper conduct and to determine an appropriate 
resolution of the investigation.”160 Utilizing information from Promontory’s 
investigation, the New York Department of Financial Services required Standard 
Chartered to “pay a penalty of $340 million and to install an independent on-site 
monitor, for a period of two years.”161 The newly engaged monitor, however, 
uncovered additional misconduct at the bank, which (i) resulted in additional 
sanctions for the bank and (ii) prompted an investigation into Promontory’s 
actions.162  
The investigation of Promontory’s conduct revealed that it did not, in fact, 
maintain its independence from Standard Chartered.163 For example, Promontory 
removed a portion of an interim report at the request of the bank after the bank 
expressed concerns that the section “referred to conduct that regulators were not yet 
aware of and might ‘draw questions which we’re not yet prepared to answer.’”164 
Additionally, Promontory changed language in its reports at the request of Standard 
Chartered in an effort to make the bank’s misconduct look less significant.165 These 
facts, among others, led the New York Department of Financial Services to 
determine that “Promontory exhibited a lack of independent judgment in the 
preparation and submission of certain reports.”166 Ultimately, Promontory agreed to 
voluntarily “abstain from certain consulting arrangements in New York for six 
months” and to pay a $15 million penalty.167 
2. Promontory’s Activities Under the Compliance Process Frame 
While it certainly seems reasonable for the New York regulator to determine that 
Promontory failed to exercise an appropriate level of independent judgment, that 
determination does not attempt to uncover the root cause of Promontory’s 
misconduct. When, however, Promontory’s conduct is evaluated against the process 
frame outlined in Part II, a possible reason for its failure becomes apparent.  
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When Promontory took on the 2009 engagement, it was charged with assisting 
Standard Chartered in its efforts to detect potential misconduct. The 2010 
engagement, Project Green, while distinct, likely looked to be a very similar set of 
tasks. Even the descriptions of the two engagements appear quite similar. The 
difference, however, is that when Promontory was engaged to assist in Standard 
Chartered’s detection efforts, Promontory reported solely to the bank, but when it 
shifted into an investigatory role, Promontory had a responsibility to provide 
information to both Standard Chartered and the New York Department of Financial 
Services. This shift changed Promontory’s ethical obligations. 
The field of behavioral ethics, in part, addresses the “predictable situational and 
social forces that can lead people to engage in unethical behavior.”168 In particular, 
behavioral ethics research explains that an actor may know that a particular behavior 
is wrong, but may be “unaware of the forces that are leading [him or her] to cross 
ethical boundaries (intentional unethical behavior).”169 In the case of Promontory, the 
individuals working on Project Green most likely “knew” that it was unethical or, at 
the very least, a conflict of interest to take significant instruction from Standard 
Chartered about what to include in independent reports to the New York regulator. 
Yet they assented to making changes to their independent reports and thereby failed 
to include relevant information to the regulator. The decision to take instruction from 
Standard Chartered during the 2009 engagement would have been acceptable, but 
the shift in its role as part of the 2010 Project Green engagement changed the calculus 
by which Promontory employees should have evaluated their ethical duties and 
responsibilities. Thus, Promontory employees and management may have failed to 
identify the conversion of its role, which may have been a root cause of Promontory’s 
failure to exercise appropriate independent judgment.  
C. Example 3: Regulatory Design Failure 
In November 2011, in response to the mortgage foreclosure crisis, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”) and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) began what came to be known as the Independent 
Foreclosure Review.170 The Independent Foreclosure Review “require[ed] a review by 
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an independent consultant to determine if errors or misrepresentations made by banks 
might have caused financial harm to homeowners.”171 In particular, the reviews were 
targeted at identifying improper foreclosure practices with a goal of providing 
financial compensation to those harmed. The Independent Foreclosure Review, 
however, failed in stunning fashion. Two common rationales for the failure of the 
review are (i) that conflicts of interest existed among the independent consultants 
engaged to complete the review and (ii) that the Federal Reserve and OCC failed to 
properly supervise the reviews. But, yet again, when one utilizes this Article’s 
process frame to evaluate the compliance failure, it looks as if the root cause may be 
more complicated and related to the expansive nature of the review, which required 
consultants to engage in an unprecedented effort of detection, investigation, and 
remediation. 
1. The Failed Independent Foreclosure Review 
In April 2011, in response to the mortgage foreclosure crisis, enforcement actions 
were brought by the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of Thrift Supervision 
against fourteen mortgage servicers, which required them “to correct deficiencies in 
their servicing and foreclosure processes.”172 Specifically, each of the mortgage 
servicers was required to engage independent consultants “to conduct a multi-faceted 
independent review of foreclosure actions that occurred in 2009 and 2010.”173 
To effectuate this review, each of the independent consultants developed a set of 
questions utilized to evaluate conduct at the specific bank whose policies the 
consultant was charged with overseeing.174 The questions allowed the independent 
consultants to “evaluat[e] whether borrowers suffered financial injury through errors, 
misrepresentations, or other deficiencies in foreclosure practices and determin[e] 
appropriate remediation for those customers.”175 Additionally, the independent 
consultants were charged with “review[ing] a variety of sample cases from each 
servicer.”176 In the event an issue was identified, the independent consultant was 
required to “conduct additional secondary reviews to identify as many affected 
borrowers as possible.”177 In instances where a “borrower suffered financial injury 
as a result of” a mortgage servicer’s conduct, “the consent orders require[d] 
remediation to be provided.”178  
When the reviews commenced in November 2011, the acting head of the OCC 
said that the reviews would “take several months to complete, considering the large 
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pool of borrowers that could be part of the review.”179 Over a year later, however, 
the review ended in an abrupt fashion once it became clear that it was “doomed.”180 
The individual file reviews for various homeowners were halted in favor of a new 
deal, which allowed any homeowner who received a foreclosure notice in 2009 or 
2010—over four million people—to receive some share of a fixed, multibillion 
amount of money ranging from $250 to $125,000.181 At the time the reviews ceased, 
over $1.5 billion had been paid to the independent consultants and their employees 
or agents for the failed review.182 
The failure of the Independent Foreclosure Review, unsurprisingly, sparked 
criticism from the public at large183 and drew the ire of congressional members.184 It 
also resulted in multiple investigations by the Government Accountability Office, 
which determined that the OCC and Federal Reserve (i) needed to enhance borrower 
outreach efforts,185 (ii) should have improved oversight of the reviews,186 and (iii) 
should have done more to define testing activities aimed at overseeing the foreclosure 
reviews.187 In the weeks and months that followed, multiple accounts emerged 
blaming the review’s failure on a variety of causes, including flawed guidance from 
the regulators188 and inherent conflicts of interest by the independent consultants.189 
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And yet, when considered under the compliance process frame, another potential root 
cause comes to light. 
2. The Independent Foreclosure Review Under the  
Compliance Process Frame 
A variety of missteps led to the ineffectiveness of the Independent Foreclosure 
Review, but when one engages in root-cause analysis while utilizing the compliance 
process frame, a pragmatic limitation is revealed. The independent consultants were 
expected to conduct individualized reviews for over four million homeowners in an 
effort to detect, investigate, and remediate claims of improper foreclosure 
practices.190 The detection and investigation mechanisms required by the various 
consent orders prompted independent consultants to draft an extraordinarily large 
—in one case 2,000—set of questions for the independent consultant reviewers to 
utilize in determining whether the banks followed their own internal policies and 
practices for each individual homeowner.191 When one considers the sheer magnitude 
of the project, particularly in light of the responsibility of the independent consultants 
to engage in three stages of the compliance process for over four million 
homeowners, one begins to question whether the expectations at the outset of the 
review were realistic. Regulators were concerned with ensuring that the monetary 
remediation received by homeowners was accurate, but in the process, they crafted 
a highly burdensome review that required the consultants to do much more than 
simply oversee the monetary remediation efforts. Therefore, it may be that a root 
cause of the Independent Foreclosure Review’s failure was a result of a failed 
regulatory design at the outset of the engagement. 
D. Example 4: Lack of Commitment to Compliance  
Baylor University (“Baylor”), a private Christian university located in Waco, 
Texas, is “a [n]ationally [r]anked [r]esearch [i]nstitution” that “provides a vibrant 
campus community for more than 16,000 students.”192 Baylor describes itself as “a 
place where the Lordship of Jesus Christ is embraced, studied, and celebrated . . . 
[that is] compelled to care for one another and to address the challenges of [a] hurting 
world.”193 Baylor, however, failed to address allegations and incidents of sexual 
assault within its student body for several years.194 Baylor’s failure to live up to its 
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own stated values and those required of it by the Department of Education has a 
variety of causes. One of the primary causes pointed to is the deficiencies within 
Baylor’s Title IX compliance program.195 While it is correct that a failure by Baylor 
to implement an effective Title IX compliance program was a significant cause of its 
sexual assault scandal, careful study demonstrates that the compliance process at 
Baylor was deficient at each and every step. Thus, Baylor’s sexual assault scandal 
was not just a result of an ineffective compliance program. Instead, it appears to 
reflect a lack of commitment by Baylor to create, implement, or prioritize a Title IX 
compliance program. 
1. Baylor’s Failed Compliance Process 
Baylor’s failure to prevent Title IX violations was significant. First, Baylor did 
not develop a formal Title IX program,196 despite guidance provided to schools by 
the Department of Education in 2011.197 Second, “[p]rior to the 2014-2015 academic 
year, Baylor failed to provide training and education to students [and] failed to 
identify and train responsible employees under Title IX.”198  
Baylor also neglected to properly detect Title IX violations. For example, Baylor 
did not “provide clear information about reporting options and resources on 
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campus.”199 Additionally, Baylor “failed to have a centralized process for ensuring 
that all reports reached the Title IX Coordinator.”200 As a result, some reporting went 
directly to athletic department staff, who were not trained in Title IX compliance and 
failed to refer several Title IX violations to appropriate individuals within the 
university.201  
The claims of sexual assault that were referred to the appropriate office at the 
time, the university’s judicial affairs office, were not properly investigated by Baylor 
staff. For example, Baylor “failed to appropriately evaluate and balance institutional 
safety and Title IX obligations against a complainant’s request for anonymity or that 
no action/investigation be pursued.”202 Additionally, Baylor “failed to conduct 
prompt, equitable, adequate, and reliable investigations.”203 Moreover, Baylor 
administrators charged with investigating claims of sexual assault “were not 
adequately trained in the dynamics of sexual and gender-based harassment and 
violence, dating violence, domestic violence, stalking, [and] the neurobiological 
impacts of trauma.”204  
Baylor’s failures to prevent, detect, and properly investigate claims of sexual 
misconduct became a high-profile scandal in January 2014, when a former football 
player was found guilty of sexually assaulting a former Baylor student and sentenced 
to twenty years in prison.205  
Baylor did eventually engage in what appeared to be a sincere attempt to address 
its past compliance failures. In November 2014, it hired its first full-time Title IX 
coordinator who was charged with building and strengthening the Title IX office.206 
In August 2015, it conducted an internal inquiry into how it handled sexual assault 
allegations.207 And in September 2015, it hired external counsel to conduct an 
“investigation into how the university handle[d] cases of alleged sexual violence,” 
which resulted in 105 recommendations for the university to implement.208 In June 
2016, the university’s interim president expressed Baylor’s commitment to 
implement the recommendations, explaining that he “consider[ed] them to be 
mandates” that must be adopted “so this will not happen again.”209  
And yet, Baylor’s initial remediation efforts appear unsuccessful. The individual 
hired in October 2014 to run its new Title IX office eventually resigned in October 
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2016, citing an inability to perform her job due to “resistance . . . from senior 
leadership.”210 In particular, she claimed to have “never had the authority, resources 
or independence to do her job.”211 She went so far as to file a formal complaint with 
the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights, as did another staff 
member of the Title IX office.212 Baylor’s efforts to address the misconduct that 
occurred within its organization and improve its Title IX compliance are ongoing, 
and only time will tell their relative success or failure.  
2. The Baylor Scandal Under the Compliance Process Frame 
Thus, Baylor engaged in long-term resistance to creating and implementing a Title 
IX compliance program despite clear regulatory guidance from the Department of 
Education and signals from its community about the need for an effective Title IX 
compliance program. This insight may have been helpful for those responsible for 
implementing a compliance program at Baylor, and it may also have important 
takeaways for organizations responsible for regulating Baylor’s conduct. 
It is possible that Baylor employees, students, and other members were suffering 
from what cognitive psychologists refer to as the “halo effect.” The halo effect is a 
cognitive bias “in which one’s judgment of a person’s character can be influenced 
by one’s overall (and usually first) impression of him or her, with little actual 
knowledge of the individual.”213 While initially a tool used for individuals, the halo 
effect has been documented to influence how businesses are viewed. For example, 
recent economics scholarship determined that when a business is perceived as 
socially responsible, the company received an average of $2 million less in fines after 
being found to have committed an FCPA violation, even though social responsibility 
and foreign bribery are uncorrelated.214  
As relevant to Baylor, it may be that individuals’ positive impressions of the 
school made it difficult for them to recognize that it was failing in a profound way to 
develop and maintain an effective Title IX compliance program. Indeed, the halo 
effect may have impacted the ability of individuals to conceive of Baylor having a 
problem with sexual assault on its campus at all. If, however, individuals at Baylor 
had utilized a process frame to evaluate its missteps prior to engaging in its initial 
remediation effort, they may have realized the depth of the institutional deficiencies 
in the Title IX space and been more receptive to the requests of the initial Title IX 
director. 
Additionally, the compliance frame may be helpful for regulators tasked with 
assessing the progress a regulated entity is making toward meeting certain 
compliance requirements. For example, a regulator assessing Baylor’s commitment 
to Title IX may have initially believed it could take a relatively hands-off approach 
and allow Baylor to initiate a compliance program without robust oversight. When, 
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however, one utilizes a process frame and determines the extent of Baylor’s 
shortcomings in the Title IX area, it may prompt the regulator to engage in more 
aggressive actions in an effort to ensure Baylor implements the reforms necessary to 
create and maintain a compliance program that is likely to be successful. 
Thus, the root cause of Baylor’s compliance failure—a lack of commitment to a 
Title IX compliance program—might more readily be identified when a compliance 
frame is utilized. A lack of commitment is an extremely high hurdle to clear for those 
charged with implementing a compliance program, but recognizing the lack of 
commitment may be the key insight needed to develop a strategy that can begin to 
overcome the related cultural resistance to long-term organizational change.  
* * * * 
To be sure, the predictive value of these examples is necessarily limited. The 
benefit of full and complete information about the compliance outcomes outlined in 
this Part was not available to those charged with constructing these efforts, which 
means an element of hindsight bias is likely present in these accounts. The potential 
power of the process frame suggested by this Article will need to be utilized before 
any final determinations can be made with regard to its usefulness. Despite this 
limitation, the process frame does provide a new tool of assessment that leads to an 
alternative, or additional, determination regarding the root cause of some relatively 
significant compliance failures. As such, at a minimum the compliance frame 
presented in Part II of this Article may assist in more fully understanding the nature 
and scope of certain compliance failures.  
IV. BENEFITS & POTENTIAL CONCERNS 
This Article seeks to provide a new method for evaluating compliance failures. 
This Part addresses some, although certainly not all, of the potential benefits of this 
Article’s proposed framework. The Part then addresses some potential concerns 
raised by the arguments herein.  
A. Benefits 
If those charged with creating and modifying compliance programs were to utilize 
the compliance process outlined in this Article when attempting to determine the root 
cause of the failure before them, a variety of benefits would follow. This Part 
addresses a few such benefits. It begins by discussing how the process frame may 
assist in narrowing the potential cause or causes of systematic compliance failures. 
The Part goes on to explain how the process frame can be utilized for institutional 
design efforts. It then explains how the process frame—an intervention made 
primarily for the benefit of those within organizations responsible for developing and 
assessing compliance failures—might also be useful for governmental actors charged 
with incentivizing effective ethics and compliance programs within organizations. 
The Part next explains how the process frame helps to support the establishment of 
compliance as a discrete field of study. It continues by identifying the ways in which 
the Article’s proposal might improve assessments of conflicts of interest. It 
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concludes by discussing how a process frame may bolster notions of procedural 
fairness within firms engaged in creating and modifying their compliance programs. 
1. Assist in Narrowing the Cause of Systemic Compliance Failures 
In an earlier article, I criticized the government’s current enforcement strategy, 
because it focuses on particular compliance areas, like Title IX or the FCPA, instead 
of considering whether there is a larger, more sophisticated failure within a firm’s 
compliance program.215 My previous study, for example, demonstrated that Hewlett-
Packard entities engaged in improper bribery that violated the laws of three different 
statutory regimes.216 One problem with a segmented enforcement strategy is that it 
fails to incentivize firms to systematically assess the effectiveness of their 
compliance efforts. This Article’s proposed framework, however, might be helpful 
to firms that would like to undertake more holistic assessments of their compliance 
programs. A firm may be able to utilize the Article’s proposed framework to engage 
in its own independent assessment of whether similar types of misconduct within the 
firm should prompt changes within its broader compliance efforts. Specifically, the 
framework may assist firms in their efforts to determine whether multiple 
compliance failures occurred in the same stage of the compliance process. If all of 
the failures occurred in one stage, like the prevention stage, it might serve as evidence 
of a need for the company to revamp its policies and procedures surrounding 
prevention in a broad and systematic manner.  
2. Utilized in Institutional Design Efforts 
The process frame outlined in this Article is primarily put forth to assist 
compliance actors in their attempts to determine the root cause of compliance 
failures. The process frame can also, however, be utilized in institutional design 
efforts. Once compliance actors have used the process frame to determine the root 
cause or causes of a compliance failure, they can then use the information gleaned to 
make tangible changes to the organization’s compliance program. For instance, a 
company could determine how it should best allocate resources among the four 
stages. It may be that a firm decides it is overspending on the prevention stage and 
should allocate more resources toward detection. Currently, the Organizational 
Guidelines emphasize prevention and detection, so one often sees firms spend a great 
deal of time on those two stages within the compliance process, but an assessment 
that relies upon the compliance process frame may reveal deficiencies with a firm’s 
investigative function. Additionally, utilizing a process frame may make it easier to 
break out tasks in manageable components and determine what work has and has not 
been completed. Because firms often employ both in-house and external actors to 
assist them in their compliance programs, it may be helpful to definitively assign 
responsibility for different stages within the compliance process to particular 
departments or external attorneys, auditors, or consultants. To the extent that both in-
house and external actors engaged in duplicative work, using the process frame may 
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also assist in efforts to compare and evaluate what was and was not done by the 
internal and external actors and identify where the two sets of actors’ results 
diverged.  
3. Provide Regulators with an Additional Tool for  
Evaluating Compliance Failures 
The primary purpose of this Article is to provide those charged with creating and 
implementing compliance programs with another tool for assessing compliance 
failures. Internal compliance officers are often in the best position to determine the 
root cause of compliance failures and challenges within their particular organization 
because they are aware of the most significant risks their organizations face.  
This Article’s proposed compliance process frame might be equally useful to 
regulators and prosecutors engaged in investigations of organizational misconduct. 
Government enforcement agents are charged with determining appropriate sanctions 
and remedial actions for organizations that fail to comply with legal and regulatory 
mandates, which require an assessment regarding the nature and scope of the 
wrongdoing. For misconduct that looks pervasive, a government enforcement agent 
may be more likely to issue a significant sanction. For misconduct that looks like an 
aberration, the government enforcement agent may want to decline to impose a 
penalty altogether. When making these sorts of distinctions, it may be helpful for 
regulators and prosecutors to assess whether the compliance failure at an 
organization involved one or multiple stages within the compliance process. 
Additionally, knowing what stage in the compliance process misconduct occurred 
might assist them in crafting certain remedial actions and consequences. 
The upshot is that regulators and prosecutors, not just industry leaders and 
compliance personnel, might also benefit from utilizing the compliance process 
frame to assess compliance failures.  
4. Identifies Compliance as a Discrete Field of Study 
The examples used in this Article encompass a diverse set of regulatory and legal 
requirements and include organizations of differing corporate forms when discussing 
compliance failures. The field of compliance is an emerging one within legal 
scholarship, but the diversity of issues raised by compliance may make some wonder 
whether it truly is its own field. One additional benefit of this Article’s proposed 
framework is that it assists in the effort to identify common concepts and 
characteristics that are found throughout the field of compliance. Whether the 
compliance program is targeted toward bribery, sexual assault, product liability, or 
consumer protection, all compliance programs must consider how they can prevent 
misconduct, detect when wrongdoing occurs, investigate the scope of the 
misconduct, and determine the best steps for remediating the malfeasance within the 
organization. The stability of the compliance process helps identify seemingly 
divergent areas into a cognizable field of study.  
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5. Improved Ability to Assess Potential Conflicts of  
Interest Within the Compliance Process 
One common concern presented by compliance failures is the role that conflicts 
of interest play in the underlying misconduct. Two of the four examples outlined in 
Part III of this Article have what appear to be conflict of interest stories.  
For example, Promontory was allowed to assist Standard Chartered in its 
investigation after already being engaged in a detection effort. Promontory may have 
developed a strong sense of loyalty to Standard Chartered, or it may have been 
suffering from capture217 as a result of its prior relationship. Additionally, 
Promontory may have hoped to continue its relationship with Standard Chartered at 
the conclusion of Project Green, the investigative engagement, particularly given the 
highly lucrative nature of the project to Promontory, which earned $54.5 million in 
total revenue from its work on Project Green.218 Similarly, multiple conflicts of 
interest were detected as part of the Independent Foreclosure Review, as many of the 
independent consultants had prior auditing relationships with the mortgage servicers 
they were assigned to oversee.219 
Interestingly, these conflicts of interest should have been apparent to the relevant 
regulators in each of these examples. The conflicts were not secret and the prior 
relationships were subject to public reporting. And yet, the regulators failed to (i) 
appreciate the existence of the conflict of interest or (ii) properly assess the potential 
importance of the conflict.  
The existence of a conflict of interest does not necessarily mean that a person or 
entity should be barred from assisting a firm or organization in future compliance 
efforts. Indeed, prior familiarity with a certain company or industry might actually 
result in certain efficiencies, improved working relationships, or more optimal 
compliance recommendations. But potential conflicts of interest should be evaluated 
fully and completely, and one potential benefit to this Article’s proposed framework 
is that it might assist in those efforts by making certain distinctions—like a 
conversion of an external compliance consultant’s role in a manner that creates 
conflicts of interest—more apparent. 
6. Bolster Notions of Procedural Fairness 
One challenge for individuals charged with creating, implementing, and 
maintaining compliance programs is finding ways to get employees and other 
members within the organization to comply with the actual compliance program. 
Research from the field of social psychology has determined an essential component 
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of shaping the behavior of individuals lies in the perceived fairness of the processes 
authorities use.220  
For example, “[p]eople think that decisions are being more fairly made when 
authorities are neutral and unbiased and make their decisions using objective 
indicators, not their personal views.”221 By purposefully and publicly utilizing the 
compliance process frame when assessing compliance failures, individuals charged 
with making changes to compliance programs may more readily demonstrate that 
they have engaged in an unbiased, deliberative process. Using the compliance frame 
as a tool may encourage organizational employees and members to perceive the 
resulting changes in policies and procedures as the legitimate conclusion of a fair 
assessment process. And if the modifications to the compliance program are 
perceived as fair, it is more likely that the organization’s members and employees 
will adhere to the parameters of the program. 
B. Potential Concerns 
Despite the many benefits to this Article’s proposed framework, there are some 
potential concerns raised by this Article and the proposed framework. This Section 
begins by discussing whether this Article’s proposal will potentially create “paper” 
compliance programs instead of encouraging “cultures of compliance.” The Section 
next discusses whether the process frame suggested by this Article is a genuinely 
new idea within compliance scholarship. It then addresses whether the Article’s 
proposal would be equally applicable to internal and external compliance actors. The 
Section goes on to assess whether there is an appreciable distinction between the 
Article’s use of “prevention” and more classic discussions regarding the role of 
gatekeepers. Finally, the Section discusses the roles of information disclosure and 
adjudication within the four stages of the compliance process. 
1. Paper Programs Versus Cultures of Compliance 
One common refrain within compliance circles is a concern that organizations 
will engage in so-called “paper compliance.” Paper compliance refers to the 
development of a compliance program on paper that is ineffectual in practice.222 The 
concerns about paper compliance often dovetail into discussions about how an 
organization can create a culture of compliance. Recent legal scholarship has 
recognized that “[c]ulture becomes especially important . . . when . . . the structural 
aspects of compliance and supervision cannot or do not otherwise influence 
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behavior.”223 Thus, one major question raised by this Article’s proposed framework 
is whether it is likely to (i) contribute to the undesirable creation of paper compliance 
programs or (ii) promote more effective cultures of compliance.  
In regard to the first question, the Article’s proposed framework is meant to 
combat “paper compliance” programs by providing a new tool for assessing the root 
cause of compliance failures. By changing the inquiry from the broad question of 
“why did the compliance program fail” to the more precise inquiry of “where within 
the compliance process did misconduct occur,” this Article’s proposal is aimed at 
improving assessments of corporate misconduct. When assessments more clearly 
identify the root causes of organizational malfeasance, it will make it more difficult 
for firms to employ ineffective remediation efforts. That is not to say that it would 
be impossible for a firm to attempt to utilize the process frame in a surface way, but 
essentially all methods of reform are vulnerable to manipulation by sufficiently 
motivated bad actors. That possibility is not a reason to abandon the intervention. 
In regard to the second question, it appears unlikely that the compliance process 
frame on its own would encourage a firm committed to noncompliance to make 
meaningful change toward a more compliant culture. “Culture of compliance refers 
to the shared beliefs—‘sense-making’—inside any given organization about the 
importance or legitimacy of legal compliance vis-à-vis other pressures and goals.”224 
The compliance process frame will not, on its own, change the shared beliefs within 
a firm with a defunct compliance culture. It may, however, serve to expose the extent 
of the deficiencies within an organization’s culture. And that exposure may create a 
set of incentives—whether from regulatory action or public pressure—to change the 
culture within the organization. 
2. The Four Stages of the Compliance Process Are Already  
Recognized as Important to Compliance Efforts 
As outlined in Part II, each stage of the proposed compliance process frame has 
been recognized as important by previous scholarship, courts, or regulatory 
mechanisms. Thus, a question may exist as to whether this Article’s attempted 
intervention is providing a genuinely new framework for assessing compliance 
failures. For example, a recent article explained:  
The common structural framework for compliance includes (1) a 
commitment from senior leadership to the task, setting a right “tone at 
the top;” (2) delegation of authority to officials with distinct compliance 
responsibilities and the resources to do their task; (3) firm-wide 
education and training about both the substance and process of 
compliance; (4) informational mechanisms to alert as to suspicious 
activity (e.g., whistleblowing procedures); (5) audit and surveillance 
tactics to detect compliance failures or risks; and (6) internal 
investigation, response, discipline and remediation so as to learn and 
adjust when failures occur. The right mix of these is firm-specific, a 
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customization that recognizes the great range of motives, opportunities, 
and types of violations most likely to be a problem at a given firm.225 
The concepts of prevention, detection, investigation, and remediation are present in 
this description, which means individuals charged with assessing compliance failures 
are likely aware of the importance of these concepts. 
This Article is not arguing that it is inventing new methods for assessing 
compliance failures. Instead, it has (i) evaluated compliance failures across a wide 
variety of legal and regulatory areas, (ii) determined that within that diversity there 
are four stages that those charged with overseeing compliance efforts must consider 
or address, and (iii) suggested that these four common aspects within the compliance 
process can be utilized to frame inquiries surrounding the root cause of compliance 
failures.  
Because the method by which one frames a question can affect the answers one 
is able to identify, this Article’s suggestion to purposefully utilize these four 
components of the compliance process when undergoing and assessing compliance 
efforts does allow these previously recognized concepts to serve a new purpose. The 
current approach to addressing compliance failures has tended to focus on why or 
how compliance failures occurred, which allowed for concrete answers. The question 
did not, however, prompt or force institutions to consider the full complexity of their 
compliance breakdowns. The hope is that this Article’s proposal will encourage a 
more robust inquiry and corresponding root-cause analysis into the causes of 
corporate misconduct and potential avenues for corrective action.  
3. Internal Compliance Assessments 
The first three examples given in Part III involved external individuals charged 
with addressing compliance challenges or failures within a separate organization or 
firm, and the fourth involved a very public compliance failure. This may prompt one 
to wonder about the salience of this Article’s proposed framework when dealing with 
purely internal compliance assessments.  
Because the proposal outlined in this Article will need to be utilized and tested 
before its potential effectiveness can be fully and properly assessed, it is difficult to 
say definitively how the proposal may function when utilized by internal compliance 
personnel to engage in confidential assessments. The use of external and public 
examples in Part III was motivated by an attempt to utilize well-known examples 
that had been heavily reported on in public spaces, so that the Article’s claims would 
remain accessible to a wide audience of readers. Internal compliance failures and 
challenges often remain just that, internal, which makes it more challenging to garner 
examples that can be shared in a public forum. That said, the hope is that this 
Article’s proposal will be considered for use by those within industry.  
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4. The Propriety of Utilizing the Same Framework for  
Public Firms and Nonprofit Organizations 
The examples in this Article include both public firms, like Apple, and nonprofit 
organizations, like Baylor.226 It is often the case in legal scholarship that the 
public/nonprofit divide is inappropriate to cross, and a question remains about the 
propriety of utilizing the same process frame for evaluating misconduct in different 
types of organizations.  
 While it is certainly true that different organizations often face distinct challenges 
and difficulties, at its core the task of identifying the root cause of misconduct within 
firms and organizations remains the same, or basically the same, inquiry. This 
Article’s proposed framework is aimed at assisting industry leaders, policymakers, 
and academics in determining why misconduct occurred, but the strategies 
implemented for resolving the misconduct might differ widely based on the type of 
organization where the wrongdoing occurred. For example, in another article, I 
proposed a more aggressive enforcement regime for corporate repeat offenders, but 
the proposed solutions were only applicable for public companies.227 More research 
is certainly needed regarding the different compliance challenges facing public firms 
and nonprofit organizations, but as of now it does appear that conducting a root-cause 
analysis may be a similar task regardless of corporate form. 
5. Whether There Is a Relevant Distinction Between This Article’s  
Use of “Prevention” and the Classic “Gatekeeper” 
This Article suggests that the first stage in the compliance process is one of 
prevention. Gatekeepers are often characterized as actors who are charged with 
preventing misconduct within firms. The tie between the concepts of gatekeeping 
and prevention is strong, which raises a question as to whether this Article’s use of 
“prevention” is meant to include the role of gatekeepers or is a purposeful attempt to 
exclude gatekeepers from its typology. 
For example, in discussing misconduct committed by senior officers of a firm, 
legal scholarship explains that “preventive measure[s] establish[] an internal gate and 
gatekeeper that can bar misconduct, either literally or figuratively, unless the would-
be wrongdoer invests resources and skill in circumventing it.”228 Similarly, when 
discussing the proper role of the corporate attorney, one potential role is known as 
“the gatekeeper model,” which “may require the attorney to take affirmative steps to 
prevent or limit client wrongdoing.”229 Thus, the ideas of prevention and gatekeeping 
often appear together. Moreover, discussions of compliance often talk about the role 
of the gatekeeper, which makes its omission from this Article’s framework 
potentially concerning. For example, the leading compliance casebook describes a 
gatekeeper as “someone who guards a gate. The ‘gate’ in this metaphor separates the 
organization from some objective that the organization seeks to achieve. The 
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gatekeeper has control over the gate, and accordingly can prevent or impede the 
organization from achieving its objective.”230  
It is certainly true that gatekeepers are quite important to compliance efforts. This 
Article’s dependence on the word prevention, however, is done to ensure clarity of 
meaning and thought. As has been noted, “[t]he term ‘gatekeeper’ is widely used in 
compliance circles, but the specific meaning is not always precise.”231 There are 
competing definitions of gatekeepers throughout legal scholarship, with some 
emphasizing service providers232 and others focusing on a type of liability.233 Because 
of the ongoing debate about what is and is not a gatekeeper, this Article’s framework 
has deliberately avoided the term. 
6. The Role of Information Disclosure 
Recent scholarship has explained that “the compliance function attends to the 
flow of information within [an] organization.”234 As such, one may wonder why this 
Article’s proposed framework does not discuss the role of information disclosure. 
Across all four stages of the compliance process, there are a variety of functions that 
individuals engaged in compliance efforts undertake. One of those functions is to 
provide information from one part of the organization to another. For example, the 
compliance department may be responsible for training lower-level employees while 
also responsible for reporting misconduct to senior management. The information 
disclosure function is present and necessary at each stage of the compliance process. 
Because information disclosure is a function of compliance efforts and not a distinct 
stage within the compliance process, a robust discussion of information disclosure is 
not necessary for understanding this Article’s proposed framework. It is, however, 
an essential component of an effective compliance program.  
7. The Role of Adjudication Within the Process Frame 
As outlined, this Article does not address formal and informal adjudicative 
decisions and where they would fit within the compliance process framework. 
Formal adjudication may consist of a decision from a court, regulatory body, or self-
regulatory organization, while informal adjudication may include a decision by an 
organization that one of its employees or agents engaged in misconduct. Adjudicative 
decisions—both formal and informal—are important because they allow a firm to 
understand that misconduct did in fact occur. They can occur, however, at the 
detection, investigation, and remediation stages. It may be that a company detects 
misconduct and immediately understands and interprets the relevant actions as 
misconduct. In other instances, a firm may detect potential misconduct, but the 
formal finding of misconduct is not confirmed until after an investigative period. 
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This is important because it is possible to initiate an investigation and determine that 
a compliance failure did not in fact occur. Finally, a remediation effort into corporate 
misconduct will sometimes uncover other instances of wrongdoing within the 
organization. This insight cements the importance of firms fully engaging and 
investing in each stage of the compliance process, so that informal and formal 
adjudicative decisions are made properly. 
CONCLUSION 
As is detailed above, there are a number of reasons and incentives for firms and 
organizations to comply with legal and regulatory requirements, but compliance 
failures persist. This Article is the second in a series of articles aimed at improving 
compliance programs, and this particular Article makes three primary contributions 
to legal scholarship.  
First, it demonstrates that compliance failures can be analyzed using a process 
frame based on the four stages of prevention, detection, investigation, and 
remediation. Currently, academics, regulators, industry professionals, and the public 
often focus broadly on the “compliance failure,” but this Article shifts the framing 
of the inquiry presented in a manner that forces compliance actors to be more 
deliberative and focused when making assessments.  
Second, the Article argues that utilizing a process frame may in many instances 
lead to a new or additional root-cause determination when evaluating compliance 
failures. Currently, when compliance failures occur, compliance actors often focus 
on the immediate misconduct or wrongdoing without systematically assessing 
whether there might have been multiple failures or contributing causes. As a result, 
those charged with overseeing remediation efforts at firms may not fully appreciate 
the scope of work that needs to be undertaken. This Article’s framework will assist 
in efforts to hone in on the root cause of compliance failures. This assistance holds 
even when an organization is not fully committed to creating an effective compliance 
program. 
Third, it provides yet another tool for those charged with improving compliance 
within firms and organizations. For example, the Article’s framework will improve 
the ability to assess potential conflicts of interest within the compliance process. 
Additionally, it will provide regulators with another tool for evaluating compliance 
failures. The Article’s framework will also assist compliance actors in pinpointing 
systemic compliance failures. Finally, utilizing a process frame may increase notions 
of procedural fairness and encourage organizations’ members and employees to 
comply with newly implemented policies and procedures. 
Compliance failures are often quite complex, but this Article’s proposal allows 
complex compliance failures to be assessed in components that are more 
manageable. As such, it will hopefully assist in the greater effort to improve 
compliance programs at firms and organizations more generally. 
 
